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The Internet has been a counter-public space for Palestinian liberation politics for over a 
decade, and digital technologies have become an increasingly important tool for solidarity 
groups across the world. However, the Israeli state and Zionist supporters worldwide are 
harnessing the same technologies and platforms to mobilize technology primarily to increase 
pro-Israel sentiments. The aims of this article are to examine hasbara [Israeli public diplomacy] 
through an exploration of similar diplomacy programmes; to illustrate how social media have 
affected the basic algorithms of hasbara; and to probe the assertions of hasbara in the light 
of pro-Palestinian solidarity. Through a study of public diplomacy, this article critically 
analyzes hasbara as a site of contestation and a method that is hampered by contradictions. 
On the one hand, there has been a massive growth in hasbara in recent years—indicated by 
the increase in funding for it and by its professionalized and centralized character; and on 
the other hand, hasbara has attracted sharp critiques in Israel for its reputed failures. To 
understand this contradiction, hasbara must be placed within the context of Israel’s settler-
colonialism, which sets the state apart from other ‘post-conflict’ states. This article reviews 
the methods utilized in hasbara, as well as their readjustment in the context of recent wars. 
Events in 2014 illustrate that hasbara actually destabilizes Israel’s diplomacy. Online journalism 
and the suppression of solidarity for Palestine together stimulate more criticism and, in turn, 
help to shift public opinion. Paradoxically, therefore, adjustments (‘hasbara 2.0’) have 
underlined the image of Israel as a colonial power engaged in violent occupation.
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There have been many sterling pieces researching and undermining Israel’s 
Gaza fairy story, but even they are evidence that Israel has succeeded in setting 
an agenda.1
In the summer of 2014 Israel launched a seven-week military attack on the Gaza Strip. 
Over 2,000 Palestinians were killed, over 10,000 wounded, an estimated 500,000 were 
internally displaced, and enormous material damage led to an estimated cost of 
US$4 billion for reconstruction and relief.2 However, during this military attack (called 
Operation Protective
1 C. Miéville (2006) The Lies that Aren’t Meant to Deceive Us, Socialist Review (November) Issue 311. 
Available at http://socialistreview.org.uk/311/lies-arent-meant-deceive-us, accessed August 15, 2015.
2 See, for instance, the detailed report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA 2014) Gaza Crisis Appeal: September 2014 Update. Available at 
http://www.ochaopt.org/doc- uments/gaza_crisis_appeal_9_september.pdf, and a similar report at 
http://www.unocha.org/aggregator/ sources/73?page=18, accessed August 15, 2015.
Edge), another war was taking place in cyberspace. These parallel clashes were not separate 
events, as each was an extension of the other. Countless images of the devastating military 
attack against Gaza dominated (social) media platforms, occasionally juxtaposed with scenes 
of large protests across the world. Due to huge advances in digital mediation, this kind of 
citizen journalism generated more visual material than ever before, archiving a Palestinian 
tragedy in blunt, yet poignant, detail. The wide dissemination of this content discomfited 
the mainstream media, provoking intense debates about Israel’s media strategies.3 Did this 
war, with its huge destruction and casualties, which appears to have mobilized people across 
the world in opposition, signal a tipping point for Israel’s public diplomacy? If so, did the 
internet play a crucial role in Israel losing the ‘media war,’ and how are the internet and 
mainstream media related? Digital technology plays a key role in the way that Israel projects 
itself internationally, and also in the ways in which Palestinians resist the Israeli occupation. 
The basic internet penetration rates for the occupied Palestine territories (oPt) and Israel 
(60 and 90 percent, respectively) signify that online technologies are deeply embedded in 
both societies.4 Palestine was an early and enthusiastic adopter when the internet emerged 
in the Arab world, coinciding with the Second Intifada in 2000.5 Meanwhile, Israel’s priv- 
ileged IT development position and ‘poster boy’ status as a ‘Start-Up Nation’ confirms its 
world-leading position in the cyber warfare industry.6 Nevertheless, this position has not 
prevented critique.
Problems regarding Israel’s reputation are not new. The state has faced strong criticism 
and public embarrassment during military campaigns in previous decades—most notably 
Lebanon in 1982, 1996 and 2006—and especially during Operation Defensive Shield (2002), 
when it instituted a violent military campaign in the West Bank during the Second Intifada. 
The years 2000–2005 also constituted a crucial period for the crystallization of online 
(and offline) anticolonial resistance: Events during this period delivered graphic images 
that became a part of peoples’ collective memory, the impact of which went far beyond 
those directly involved, as illustrated elsewhere.7 Since 2005, the emergence of blogging, 
user-generated videos, and social networking have all added to this development.8 The mil- 
itary campaigns in 2008–09 (Operation Cast Lead), 2012 (Operation Pillar of Clouds) and 
2014 (Operation Protective Edge), which subjected Gaza to violent military campaigns, and
3 Debates focused initially on how images from Syria were claimed to be from Gaza. However, as visual evi- 
dence from the war emerged, the issue then shifted from verifying sources to overcoming discomfort about the 
upsetting content itself. For discussions about the various competing social media claims, see R. Tooth (2014) 
Warning: Upsetting Images, The Guardian (G2), July 27, 2015; also see BBC special at https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=XnO4gy8dQIc debate, date of access; and Guardian contribution, http://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2014/jul/21/sharing-pictures-corpses-social-media-ceasefire, accessed August 15, 2015.
4 Most figures for the oPt cover the West Bank only, but it is expected that Gaza has higher numbers. For regional/ 
MENA statistics see: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm, accessed August 15, 2015.
5 See M. Aouragh (2011) Palestine Online (London: I. B. Tauris).
6 D. Senor and P. Singer (2009) Start-Up Nation: The Story of Israel’s Economic Miracle (New York: McClelland
& Stewart).
7 M. Aouragh (2008) Virtual Intifada: Online Activism and Everyday Resistance, Journal of Arab and Muslim 
Media Research 1(2), pp. 109–130.
8 For more on the changing media landscapes in Palestine and their social and political implications, see
M. Aouragh (2011) Palestine Online; M. Sienkiewicz (2012) Out of Control: Palestinian News Satire and 
Government Power in the Age of Social Media, Popular Communication: The International Journal of 
Media and Culture, 10(1–2), pp. 106–118; L. Alsaafin (2013) Palestinians Turn to Facebook in Fight Against 
Occupation, Al Monitor. Available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/social-media-pales- 
tinian-activism.html#, accessed August 15, 2015.
4which have been widely condemned as constituting war crimes,9 are important moments in 
and of themselves. However, the fact that Gaza has been locked behind a land, sea and trade 
blockade since 2006—thus having its economy strangled, its infrastructure destroyed, and 
its people impoverished—has contributed in particular ways to the degeneration of Israel’s 
public image. This brutal context helps explains why the 2010 attack by Israeli forces on 
the Mavi Marmara flotilla, as it sought to break the blockade, generated extraordinary 
disapproval. In addition to the occasional condemnations in the official (diplomatic) arena, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Europe and North America have criticized Israel 
sharply in recent years.10 The barrage of negative responses to Israel’s military confrontations 
has also provoked self-critique, and the nation’s main public diplomacy strategy has become 
a popular target. Israel’s State Comptroller published a damning report regarding the 2006 
war on Lebanon.11 This critique led to the establishment of a government office dedicated 
to revamping Israel’s diplomacy, a phenomenon commonly known as hasbara [Hebrew for 
‘to explain’]. Despite novel developments and increasing international attention, hasbara is 
not a new phenomenon: it has always been regarded as a governing pillar of state politics. 
Rather than being a recent consequence of the internet, the perceived failures of hasbara 
are part of a recurring anxiety, one that has existed ever since the birth of hasbara during 
the founding of the State of Israel.
This article will argue that hasbara is best understood as the manufacturing of discontent 
with, or toward, Palestinian self-determination, while simultaneously constituting consent for 
Israel’s dominance. However, set within conventional interpretations of public diplomacy, 
hasbara involves apparent ambiguities. After demonstrating the main hypotheses of public 
diplomacy, I propose that, having emerged within a (continuing) settler-colony, hasbara 
does not suit the general public diplomacy frame. Moreover, as media and journalism are 
key contemporary domains for public diplomacy, how, then, can social media be dealt with 
as recent, yet customary, platforms for journalists? I unpack this tension by discussing the 
presence of journalists on online digital public platforms, which have exposed the contra- 
dictions between Israel’s desired and actual public persona. I then identify new forms of 
Israeli public diplomacy. The result is a rebooted version of hasbara: hasbara 2.0. This term 
has a double meaning: it both reflects the way hasbara has developed in response to social 
media, and also how it tries to adapt in response to shifting public opinion. Meanwhile,
9 For outstanding reports that contain important evidence, see: UN General Assembly Human Rights Council 
(2009) Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact- 
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict. Available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/ 
12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf; G. J. Wallance (2014) U.N. Human Rights Council’s anti-Israel inquiry, Los 
Angeles Times. Available at http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-wallance-gaza-unfair-un-resolution- 
20140729-story.html; M. Cohn (2014) US Leaders Aid and Abet Israeli War Crimes, Genocide & Crimes 
against Humanity. Available at http://jurist.org/forum/2014/08/marjorie-cohn-israel-crimes.php; A. Goodman 
and N. Shaikh (2014) As Palestinians Go to ICC, Human Rights Watch Alleges Israeli War Crimes for Shooting 
Fleeing Gazans, Democracy Now. Available at http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/25442-as-palestinians-go- 
to-icc-human-rights-watch-alleges-israeli-war-crimes-for-shooting-fleeing-gazans;   N.   Cumming-Bruce   (2014)
U.N. Reports Dire Impact on Children in Gaza Strip, New York Times, August 5, 2014. Available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2014/08/06/world/middleeast/un-reports-dire-impact-on-children-in-gaza-strip.html?_r=0>; http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28437626; Save the Children (2008) The Gaza Strip: A Humanitarian 
Implosion. Available at http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/resources/online-library/the-gaza-strip-a-humanitar- 
ian-implosion, all accessed August 15, 2015.
10 Molad (2012) Israeli Hasbara: Myths and Facts. Available at http://www.molad.org/images/upload/ 
researches/79983052033642.pdf, accessed August 15, 2015.
11 The Annual Report 61B (2010) by Comptroller (prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is discussed in 
Molad (2012).
online journalism offers content over which newsroom editors have less control, and it 
underwrites a particular information flow. Quite different from the artificial mediation of 
hasbara, this flow enables an affective relation between writer and reader. In due course, 
online media has an impact on the possibilities for Palestinian activists and international 
solidarity networks.
If accessible content—using the infrastructures of digital mass media as an active play- 
ground, rather than waiting to be heard—has the potential to influence part of the public, it 
may also solidify hasbara. For this reason, I explore the implementation of media hyper- 
bole and red flags as short-cut routes for hasbara. These efforts clearly implicate potential 
Palestinian solidarity; however, while such policy of media distraction helps hasbara, they 
are not deterministic. In other words, while techno-media infrastructures contribute to trans- 
formations in the arena of diplomacy, the internal contradictions of diplomacy and media 
processes do not make them the sole mediators of news and opinion. Hasbara is under 
pressure as a result of the coming together of technological change, shifts in international 
public opinion and the rise of pro-Palestinian activism, and these are crucial factors in this 
dialectical process. Palestine reminds us that whereas the politically contentious context and 
changing media ecologies have diplomatic ramifications, they are never settled or constant.
Deconstructing Hasbara
An exploration of hasbara has to take place within debates and conceptualizations of diplo- 
macy. There are two general approaches to public diplomacy: One that sees public diplomacy 
as a necessary evil; and another that sees it simply as a given context within which nations 
must interact.12 However, a literature review of Israeli diplomacy reveals that the idea of 
public diplomacy as a ‘necessary evil’ is more in tune with the Israeli approach to public 
diplomacy. Public diplomacy mostly is deployed with reference to a state’s foreign (geo- 
political or political-economy) policy; the basic premise of public diplomacy is influencing 
international (and sometimes domestic) publics. The perceived legitimacy of engaging in 
public diplomacy is based on the principle that antipathy to one’s power may negatively 
affect the ability to pursue one’s interests. While persuasion through public diplomacy is 
the contemporary paradigm, the case of Israel provokes a comparison with the less neutral 
term ‘state propaganda,’ (which can be understood as the communication of ideas to lure 
audiences in negative ways), that rather than persuasion typically refers to manipulation.
News management, public opinion and propaganda have long been related. Diplomacy 
has been transformed over the years so that earlier associations with totalitarianism have 
been refined into public diplomacy. Foreign policy decision-making is linked to newsroom 
decision-making. However, managing collective attitudes is mostly effective when it is 
unnoticeable because, in modern representative democracies, credibility rests on the assumed 
independence of the newsroom from political interests.13 Influencing the public is a process, 
crafted over time, the result of a form of negotiation.14 Public diplomacy is very often a 
product of, and a tool for, national security.15 The ‘war on terror’ signalled an important 
shift in public diplomacy, because the need to legitimize the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
12 N. Snow (2008) Rethinking Public Diplomacy, in: N. Snow & P. M. Taylor (eds) Routledge Handbook of Public 
Diplomacy (London: Routledge), pp. 3–11.
13 See further Z. Harb (2011) Channels of Resistance in Lebanon (London: I. B.Tauris), pp. 12–13.
14 S. Saeed (2010) News Media, Public Diplomacy and the War on Terror, in: M. Zweiri & E. C. Murphy (eds)
The New Arab Media: Technology, Image and Perception (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press), p. 51.
15 Ibid, p. 57.
6necessitated a return to Cold War styles of diplomacy. Nonetheless, 9/11 did not change the 
relationship forever: winning military wars does not depend as much on public opinion as 
on strength in the battlefield, as Saeed argued.16
The idea that the media are hegemonic has a longstanding legacy, going back at least to 
the model work of Walter Lippmann, which was the basis for the classic work by Edward 
Herman and Noam Chomsky.17 They explain that the media’s filtering of reality leaves us 
with a clean residue that is fit for printing, one which is designed to pacify the public. Class 
conflict also is performed through mass media, because financial corporations own most 
media outlets and their news production effectively elevates dominant private interests. 
Citizens are inculcated with a set of values that fit the structures of society; in the process, 
dissent is marginalized. The ‘propaganda model,’ the term used by Herman and Chomsky to 
explain mass media, builds on the idea that bourgeois media reproduces capitalists’ interests 
and offers valuable contributions. However, there are important reservations regarding the 
idea that ‘the’ media inculcate us with dominant values and beliefs. The alignment between 
the interests of capital and media do not offer fully adequate explanations. Dissenting voices 
are allowed, since there are differences between the media actors themselves, despite the fact 
that they share a capitalist framework. This was evident in the run-up to the Iraq war in the 
UK.18 The paradox is that capitalist media and news outlets function in a capitalist market 
system, and this means that they rely on customers (outlets must reflect at least some of their 
readers’ interests) and they compete with other providers, which results in certain nuances 
in the dominant discourse. Hasbara also involves conflicting practices and strategies that 
are designed to improve Israel’s reputation and to mobilize international public support, 
but it still deviates from public diplomacy. Following Edward Said,19 I regard hasbara as a 
state-orchestrated effort to manage the increasing public critique that Israel faces. Hence, 
to understand hasbara fully, we need to deconstruct public diplomacy further.
Public diplomacy is about gaining support for global and regional hegemony, it is far 
from not value free. Oddly, mainstream literature rarely explores the overall political and 
economic goals of public diplomacy (e.g., the advancing of free-market paradigms) and 
instead often employs normative terms, like ‘rough states.’ Unsurprisingly, public diplomacy 
is a US-focused topic in the literature, albeit (due to US global hegemony) one to which 
audiences and researchers across the world are predisposed. While analyses of public diplo- 
macy are framed by ethical and humanitarian language, the management of imperial policy 
is the core motive of public diplomacy.20 The widely-cited Handbook of Public Diplomacy 
(Snow and Taylor 2008) is a case in point.21 Thus, the contradictions inherent in hasbara 
in part also reside within the general liberal imperial project that underpins many public 
diplomacy studies. In an excellent review of James Panment,22  Sue Jansen addresses the
16 Ibid, p. 48.
17 N. Chomsky & E. Herman (1988) Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New 
York: Pantheon Books).
18 See, for example, C. Sparks (2006) Contradictions of capitalist media practice, in: L. Artz, S. Macek & Dana L. 
Cloud (eds) (2006) Marxism and Communication Studies: The Point is to Change it (New York: Peter Land), 
pp. 111–132.
19 See E. Said (2001) Propaganda and War, Media Monitors Networks, 31, August. Available at 
http://www.mediamonitors.net/edward37.html, accessed August 15, 2015.
20 I. Hall (2010) The Transformation of Diplomacy: Mysteries, Insurgencies and Public Relations, International 
Affairs, 86(1), p. 249.
21 Snow and Taylor (eds) Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy.
22 J. Panment (2013) New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century (London: Routledge).
corporate predisposition of public diplomacy and points to the main flaw in much research: 
a focus on ideal scenarios, rather than on critically investigating the actual practices.23
Public diplomacy is distinguished from diplomacy mainly by the fact that it is geared 
toward the media and is interested in addressing the wider public. Overall, both diplomacy 
and public diplomacy studies identified 9/11 as the moment at which a paradigm shift 
took place.24 As a result of this event, a return to unilateral and violent methods changed 
the context and shape of (public) diplomacy as a key instrument of foreign policy. This is 
reflected by problems of definition.25 Diplomacy is mainly a process of communication (as 
opposed to war), which is used to solve conflict or to maintain stability.26 Thus, while public 
diplomacy is, at its core, about how governments manage their position by promoting their 
national interests on a global scale, the way existing orders are justified depends on how they 
are positioned in a particular state structure. A relatively stable bourgeois democracy (e.g., 
Britain or the United States) will shape the content of dominant media differently and tends 
to meet the opinion of the public where it must.27 Such restrictions on the instrumentalization 
of mass media are reflected in diplomacy, albeit the extent of the limitation depends on a 
given historical context and depends also on which part of society is concerned: For instance, 
much of the careful restraints do not extend to particular minority groups.
After World War II and the processes of decolonization, and then the aftermath of the Cold 
War, imperialism and colonialism were not conditional on material (financial or military) 
superiority only: They depended more than before on the struggle for hearts and minds. 
Ideally, diplomacy relies on deterrence, rather than coercion,28 though a mixed approach 
(armed, economic and subversion) is the common reality.29 Public diplomacy therefore is 
treated differently from military-type operations (Psychological Operations [psyops]) and 
authoritarian-type propaganda. The main premise of public diplomacy is that it enhances 
state credibility by virtue of domestic and international behavior. This presents challenges 
with regard to the application of the term public diplomacy in Israel. Firstly, while hasbara 
alludes to a particular strategy of diplomacy, it is also part of a broader militarized context 
that inhibits military elements of psyop and cyber warfare.30 Again, the emphasis of public 
diplomacy is on soft measures, since voluntary legitimacy is more secure and sustainable 
than coerced obedience. Joseph Nye’s much-used term ‘soft power’ corroborates the ration- 
alization of non-violent/non-aggressive forms of submission.31 However, in this regard it is
23 Among the contributors in Snow & Taylor (eds) Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, are diplomats, mili- 
tary personal and policy consultants. A bottom-up angle and assessment after policies are put in place would, for 
instance, disclose the resistance to public diplomacy offered by a number of practitioners. See S. Jansen (2013) 
Review – New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century, E-International Relations, August 26, 2013. Available at 
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/26/review-new-public-diplomacy-in-the-21st-century/, accessed August 15, 2015.
24 See, e.g., Panment, New Public Diplomacy; Snow & Taylor (eds), Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy;
B. White (2005) Diplomacy, in: J. Baylis, S. Smith & P. Owens (eds) The Globalization of World Politics, 3rd 
edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
25 White, Diplomacy, pp. 387–403.
26 Ibid, p. 388.
27 Sparks, Contradictions of Capitalist Media Practice, p. 114.
28 White, Diplomacy, p. 394.
29 Ibid, p. 399.
30 The link between political-economy and cybersecurity are very important to the ways cyber warfare and 
diplomacy are related in Israel. I discuss this elsewhere, in M. Aouragh (2015) Between Cybercide and Cyber 
Intifada: Technologic (dis-) Empowerment of Palestinian Activism, in: L. Jayyusi & A. S. Roald (eds) Media and 
Political Contestation in the Contemporary Arab World: A Decade of Change (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 
pp. 129–160.
31 J. Nye (2005) The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs).
8useful to remember Nye actually believed a combination of hard power (military force) and 
soft power (media strategies), that he named smart power, the ideal version. A difference 
between public diplomacy and hasbara is that, unlike public diplomacy, hasbara does not 
fit into a ‘post-conflict’ framework can’t be ‘smart’. This crucial disqualification becomes 
apparent in the results of its policies and renders hasbara susceptible to much critique.
Trapped between Diplomacy and Propaganda
Israel noticed a growing change in its international reputation during the Second Intifada. 
In the words of Eytan Gilboa, Israel was subjected to ‘poisonous’ and ‘anti-Semitic’ media 
coverage throughout Europe and the Arab world.32 Ever since this time the critique about 
Israeli public diplomacy has increased inside Israel.33 According to Gilboa, officials contin- 
uously ‘failed to prevent the deterioration of Israel’s image and reputation in the world.’34 
Israel began to pursue a more serious and confrontational diplomacy.35 Indeed, Israel’s State 
Comptroller demanded an extensive examination of public diplomacy in 2002. Later, the 
conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry (into Israel’s public relations during the war on 
Lebanon in 2006), which was known as the Winograd Commission, were no less damning. 
These criticisms were repeated even more loudly as a result of the negative impact (on 
Israel’s reputation) of the 2008–2009 war on Gaza. Most Israeli reflections (to which I will 
return) argue that the problem is the lack of a proper public diplomacy policy, but taking 
into consideration the above review of public diplomacy, two important factors are ignored 
in these critiques. First, there is no shortage of public diplomacy in Israel. Second, this 
diagnosis confuses symptom with cure. This failure is the inevitable result of hasbara being 
an Israeli product, as the rest of this article will illustrate.
Whether assessed by its content or its targeted audiences, and inevitable exceptions aside, 
‘liberal democracies’ are the epistemological basis of most public diplomacy analyses. This 
is why hasbara involves an inherent contradiction that is extremely difficult to overcome 
and which continues to destabilize its objectives. In a sense, to sanitize the grim realities 
of its colonial policies against Palestinians while ensuring consent within Israel, hasbara 
needs to fill the gap between rude propaganda and sophisticated psyops, on the one hand,
32 E. Gilboa (2006) Public Diplomacy: The Missing Component in Israel’s Foreign Policy, Israel Affairs, 12(4), 
p. 715.
33 See T. Sheafer & S. Shenhav (2010) Mediated Public diplomacy in a New Era of Warfare, The 
Communication Review, 12, pp. 272–283; Gilboa, Public Diplomacy; B. D. Mor (2006) Public Diplomacy 
in Grand Strategy, Foreign Policy Analysis, 2, pp. 157–176; R. Schleifer (2003) Jewish and Contemporary 
Histories of Israeli Hasbara, Jewish Political Studies Review, 15(1–2), pp. 123–153;  M.  Sherman (2013) 
Into the Fray: Dereliction of Duty, The Jerusalem Post, October 25, 2013. Available online at 
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Into-The-Fray-Dereliction-of-duty-329723, accessed August 15, 
2015. However distressing it is to read, at times, this Israeli body of work is helpful for two reasons: Firstly, it 
does not shy away from proclaiming its militaristic goals and Zionist ideology, unlike work that is framed as 
neutral yet which adheres to Israeli agendas; and secondly, the linguistic overlap with military terminology also 
suggests a (professional) background that is shared by the authors and the military, e.g., the reference to ‘the 
enemy,’ which, in this case, only can be the Palestinians (Schleifer, Jewish and contemporary histories, p. 123).
34 Gilboa, Public diplomacy, p. 716
35 This sudden shift in argument is only possible when ignoring the negative turn that was already visible in the 
1980s, when Israel invaded Lebanon and was involved in the Sabra and Shatila massacre, followed by the 
crackdown on the non-violent mass civil uprising of the First Intifada. A telling reminder of the long legacy of 
hasbara is the quote by Abba Eban in The Jerusalem Post reproduced in the next section.
and public diplomacy, on the other hand. It is within this conceptual mire that hasbara finds 
itself unable to make a clear shift: Communication, here a merciless tool in the service of 
settler-colonialism, mutilates the quintessential meaning of public diplomacy. It attempts to 
construct consensus through persuasion about its right to occupy and repress Palestinians. 
Yet, it does so while executing military campaigns in the oPt and maintaining segregationist 
policies for Palestinians inside Israel. As Taylor argued, when a nation goes to war, public 
diplomacy is forced to take a backseat and primacy is given to military doctrines.36 Israel’s 
permanent front-seat is what gives rise to the hasbara stalemate. This tension will remain as 
long as Israel’s Zionist, colonialist objectives remain. However, even if it suddenly wanted 
to, hasbara would not be able successfully to increase its moral authority—to make a 
‘post-conflict’ shift—as that would undermine the Zionist project itself. This is why the 
words of Abba Eban from three decades ago, seem appropriate for the summer of 2014:
The immediate association in recent weeks has been the crash of steel against build- 
ings, the screams of bereaved and wounded, the children lining up for water denied 
by an Israeli ‘blockade’, the rat-infested garbage heaps, the collapse of those thin 
layers of civility which shelter human beings against their own human vulnerability. 
It is little short of idiotic to believe that this movement of opinion could have been 
arrested by technical means such as a transfer of responsibility for ‘hasbara’ from one 
Cabinet desk to another.37
Interestingly, both the Western (liberal) and Israeli (Zionist) rationales share certain basic 
contradictions in relation to diplomacy. Aside from the clear Western-liberal double standards 
(non-violent democracy at home—whilst excluding minorities from this privilege—and 
violent warfare abroad), part of hasbara’s own failing is the dysfunctional inheritance of 
Zionism. Tensions regarding diplomatic strategies are found across different ideological 
agendas because different Zionist tendencies became imperatives for public policy.38 As 
Sasson Sofer shows, certain disparate perspectives in Israel’s diplomacy are rooted in par- 
ticular political traditions (for instance, David Ben-Gurion’s Labour Zionism and Ze’ev 
Jabotinsky’s Revisionism), which produced conflicting takes on the future state, and the 
divergence continued after 1948; in fact for Sofer, the intellectual foundation of Labour 
essentially caused later failures in diplomacy.39 The idea that a certain Israeli diplomacy could 
be developed in a vacuum is a curious one, but the conclusion that an uncompromising right- 
wing approach would have made a difference is implausible. In a similar vein, the defining 
context of the 1948 war, or a Palestinian perspective, is completely absent in Zaki Shalom’s
36 P. Taylor (2008) Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications, in: Snow & Taylor (eds) Routledge Handbook 
of Public Diplomacy, p. 15.
37 This quote refers to the summer of 1982; it was published in The Jerusalem Post and was retrieved by Ben White. 
The complete quote is reproduced in B. White (2013) Abba Eban’s Comments on the Idiocy of Hasbara Just as 
True Three Decades Later, Electronic Intifada, February 18, 2013. Available at https://electronicintifada.net/ 
blogs/ben-white/abba-ebans-comments-idiocy-hasbara-just-true-three-decades-later, accessed August 15, 2015.
38 See Z. Shalom (2012) The Role of U.S. Diplomacy in the Lead-Up to the Six-Day War: Balancing Moral 
Commitments and National Interests (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press); and S. Sofer (1998) Zionism 
and the Foundations of Israeli Diplomacy (New York: Cambridge University Press). Also, R. Schleifer (2011) 
Perspectives of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Contemporary Conflicts: Essays in Winning Hearts and 
Minds (Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press).
39 Sofer, Zionism.
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study.40 As noted by Laura Eisenberg, this view is devoid of context, aside from the trite 
use of the word ‘terrorist.’41 However, Ron Schleifer maintains that the reason for Israel’s 
weak hasbara is that it is too soft, engaging too much with the ‘clean’ side.42 Elsewhere, 
Schleifer (2011) laments that hasbara is too concerned with defending itself, while it should 
be undermining the other—i.e., engaging in psyops rather than diplomacy—especially as 
Israel has far greater resources and an unrivalled security apparatus.43 Ben Mor, in contrast, 
proposed that ‘impression management’ must be a structural strategy, one that goes beyond 
mere damage control (which Mor sees as akin to hasbara).44
We see, therefore, a unique hasbara coming to life based on a meticulously engineered 
stigmatization of Palestinians. In an attempt to conceptualize this paradox of Israeli pub- 
lic diplomacy I borrow from Herman and Chomsky’s critique of the corporate media in 
Manufacturing Consent, with the aforementioned reservation that complete manipulation 
of news is complicated by the contradictions of capitalism. Going further, as the evolution 
of public diplomacy itself shows, manufacturing consent by unabashed self-promotion and 
patriotic propaganda does not fit in our times. The alternative is to construct a narrative that 
questions the other. I therefore take note of the absence of Palestinian concerns in mainstream 
media, as was pointed out in Said’s Peace and Its Discontents (1995)—the discontented 
themselves are not even consulted about their appraisal of ‘peace’ in this mainstream media.45 
It is therefore as also important for Israel to generate discontent with Palestinians and their 
message. This results in the parallel, yet reversed, formulation of hasbara as representing the 
manufacturing of discontent. In other words, it assumes the employment of both elements 
(discontent-smear for the other, defend-promote the self).
Hasbara at Work: Manufacturing Discontent
Israel’s formation of an informal Ministry of Hasbara, as part of the Foreign Ministry, in 
2013, is testimony to the professionalization and intensification of hasbara, in terms of the 
amount of interventions (and subsidies) that result from it. This (policy) transformation 
responded to a number of key moments. Schleifer identifies one moment: the capture of two 
undercover Israeli agents in a police station in Ramallah in 2002. The photos of the agents’ 
bodies being thrown out of a window (and a man holding up bloodied hands to cheering 
crowds) were the igniters of a pro-active hasbara.46 This redirection went further under the 
influence of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, 
during their first coalition government.
One of the stark paradoxes that emerges from the many ‘advisory’ documents is that the 
suggested hasbara narratives—meant to increase pro-Israeli frameworks—are already close
40 Shalom, The Role of U.S. Diplomacy.
41 See L. Z. Eisenberg (2013) Review of Shalom, Zaki. 2012. The Role of U.S. Diplomacy in the Lead-Up to the 
Six-Day War: Balancing Moral Commitments and National Interests, Digest of Middle East Studies, 22(1), 
pp. 190–193.
42 Schleifer, Jewish and Contemporary Histories, p. 124. By ‘clean’ Schleifer means non-violent or within the limits 
of the law, which completely overlooks the violence of euphemisms used to cover-up colonial injustice. The 
‘apologetic Jew’—a ‘weak and inferior Jewishness’ with a ‘Freudian longing’ for acceptance—is described as 
lacking the wit to dispense Christian prejudice; this apparently has become a source for weak hasbara (p. 126).
43 Schleifer, Perspectives of Psychological Operations.
44 Mor, Public Diplomacy in Grand Strategy, p. 160.
45 E. Said (1995) Peace and its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process (New York: 
Vintage Books).
46 Schleifer Jewish and contemporary histories of Israeli Hasbara, p. 144
Figure 1. (a) Holland4Israel: Facebook; (b) Fundraising-paraphernalia in support of Israel.
to the general journalistic language. Decades of hasbara have nurtured and constructed a 
general language for, and interpretation of, Palestine/Israel. Essentially, this discourse is 
effective because Israel has crucial leverage with regard to powerful states (Great Britain and 
United States). Pro-Israel lobbies have developed into a transnational phenomenon, funded 
largely by transnational corporate actors, which, in turn, have incorporated them further 
into neoliberal and neoconservative networks.47 Thus the successes of the pro-Israel lobby 
are possible, not because of remarkably talented ‘Jewish lobbies’ (as often and wrongly is 
assumed), but because they coincide with certain material interests.
Online journalism, however, is an arena where news and opinion have become less monolithic. 
Coupled with particular realities on the ground, this has resulted in further contradictions. The 
occasional pro-Palestinian message or alternative report beyond the mainstream frameworks 
occur in spite of an internalized hasbara among journalists—because, overall, Western mass 
media already accommodate hasbara. As mentioned, rather than being evidence of an inherent
47 H. Aked, T. Mills, T. Griffin & D. Miller (2013) The UK’s Pro-Israel Lobby in Context, Open Democracy, 
December 2, 2013. Available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/tom-mills-hilary-aked-tom-griffin-
david-miller/uk’s-pro-israel-lobby-in-context, accessed August 15, 2015.
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Figure 2. (a) IDF Twitter announcement GERvsARG hashtags; (b) Hasbara gathering as exposed 
by Electronic Intifada (courtesy of Ali Abunimah).
openness in mainstream media, this is as a consequence of the ideological cracks provided by 
a liberal (capitalist) system or dominant frameworks. Such cracks sporadically are fi with 
relevant information. The ‘both sides’ paradigm is the sort of framing that assists hasbara most 
prominently in the mainstream domain. Before discussing the transformations of hasbara itself, 
we need to consider the kind of representations of Palestine/Israel it co-designs.
‘Suicide Bombers’ and ‘Hamas Rockets’: The Politics of Red Flags
They answer the question, ‘Did Israel kill the Ghalias?’ when the question should be, 
‘What do we do about the fact that Israel killed the Ghalias?’48
The archetypical ‘two-sides’ narrative, according to which all sides are wrong, or the truth 
is somewhere in the middle, is not instinctive: The aspect of Israeli military and political 
force first must be disentangled in order for it to become convincing. One of the contrivances 
is to replace the inequality that exists in terms of material and military power with moral 
trepidations. This may take the form of conflating the number of rockets fired from Israeli 
jets and warships with the number of Palestinian handmade grenades or stones. Another 
common form is the comparison between calling for revenge in Palestinian propaganda 
videos and actually committing military massacres. As a result impact is replaced by intent 
and this itself is pathologized and divorced from reason. In recent years, the term ‘Hamas 
rockets’ has become code for such a narrative. These discursive accommodations, above 
all, have allowed journalists and analysts to forget the daily structural living conditions.
A discomforting example occurred when, during the military attack on Gaza, a television 
host cut off a Palestinian guest: ‘You had your chance. You didn’t say Hamas is a terrorist 
organization. Good-bye.’49 Moreover, the term Hamas rockets is itself a continuation of the 
term ‘suicide bombers’: Such condemnation imperatives were prevalent in dominant media 
representations and academia during the Second Intifada, and led Ghassan Hage to ask,
why it is that suicide bombing cannot be talked about without being condemned first. 
After all, we can sit and analyse in a cool manner the formidably violent colonial 
invasion without feeling that ‘absolute’ moral condemnation should be a precondition 
or even a substitute for uttering an opinion about it.50
Another common example of this kind of approach relates to the Palestinian ‘failure’ to 
commit to peace. The rejection of Israel’s propositions—the result of the fact that this peace 
would bear no resemblance to justice and basically would prolong the suffering, since it 
would change none of the structural conditions—is rarely considered. This amounts, in a 
sense, to critiquing Palestinians for not accepting compromises and thus stripping the col- 
onized of their dignity to be at least represented correctly.
48 Miéville, The Lies that Aren’t Meant to Deceive Us.
49 This telling example of the systematic demand to condemn Hamas rockets during the 2014 war was illustrated 
by the appearance of a Palestinian-American director of the Jerusalem Fund on the Fox news show Hannity. 
As Munayyer explains that he does not want to discuss his personal opinion, but to debate the reasons behind 
these violent outbursts by militants, Hannity shouted: ‘What part of this can’t you get through your thick 
head?’, before cutting Munayyer off. See the episode at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FnV9Qc9MTY, 
accessed April 2015.
50 G. Hage (2003) ‘Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm’: Understanding Palestinian Suicide Bombers in Times 
of Exighophobia, Public Culture 15(1), p. 71.
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By relating hasbara to these media practices, I aim to show that this is not simply the 
consequence of mass media-induced ignorance. For Hage, the condemnation imperative 
deliberately prevents a sociological explanation of why Palestinian suicide bombers act 
the way they do in the first place. In addition, this treatment then also muzzles criticism of 
existing international complicity. In this case, the difference between hasbara and public 
diplomacy is that it actually does not matter what Palestinians think, since hasbara initially 
is not designed to be believed by Palestinians. Unsurprisingly, since Palestinians, who have 
been resisting the occupying force for over a century, are an unlikely target, hasbara is 
mainly concerned with external influence. Its meta-goal is maintaining the international 
alliances that protect Israel through the provision of material and diplomatic support. Yet, 
when deconstructing the hasbara logic beyond this point, there is a message that is intended 
for Palestinians. Miélville’s observation ‘How, the world asked in incredulous rage, can they 
possibly think this ludicrous scenario will convince us? The answer, of course, is that they 
don’t,’51 with regard to the very coincidental shelling of a family on a Gaza beach in 2006, 
explains this proposition. The hasbara referred to in this example is simply unconvincing, 
but the goal is meant to convey a reminder of the rules of engagement, namely that Israel 
indeed can do this and then keep ‘the world’ busy with ostentatious explanations. This kind 
of framing has become one of the most important aspects of hasbara and a recurring ritual. 
The outcome, as hinted at in this article’s epigraph, is like many ceremonial formalities: 
It delays the actual question about what to do about it. The use of red flags indicates that 
the core purpose of hasbara is to distract from structural issues. Hence, besides having the 
objective of mobilizing international support for Israel, hasbara is meant to delay support 
for Palestinians and at the same time, to repair this settler-colonial omission. Suicide bomb- 
ers smoothly transitions into Hamas rockets and become the bearer of the very narratives 
that manufacture discontent. This occurred most intensely after Operation Cast Lead and I 
therefore label it the ‘cast doubt’ approach.
Hasbara 2.0: Operation ‘Cast Doubt’
State-led hasbara was nurtured under the tutelage of Daniel Seaman, Deputy Director 
General for Information at the Israeli Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs, 
followed by the Likud Member of Knesset (MK) Yuli Edelstein, after 2009. A social trend 
was already noticeable, as evidenced by the popular Israeli television show The Ambassador, 
in which contenders compete to mobilize support for Israel.52 The recruitment of multilingual 
Israelis as hasbara ambassadors is a case in point. The coordinated appeals to Israeli citizens 
to take an active part in media battles benefits from several state bodies. The Jewish Agency 
(historically concerned with settling Jews on Palestinian land), provides data about new 
Jewish immigrants, and the Immigrant Absorption Ministry enables the recruitment of large 
numbers of multilingual volunteers.53  Israel’s airline company, El Al, even experimented
51 Miéville, The Lies that Aren’t Meant to Deceive Us.
52 The normalization of hasbara through this hugely popular program revolves around a competition between 
hasbarists, battling to represents Israel; see C. Urquhart (2004) Our Man in the US: Israel uses TV show to 
Find its best Spin Doctor, Guardian, November 27, 2004. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/ 
nov/27/israel1. The programme was supported by a variety of political organizations (e.g., see Hillel International 
(2006) Vote for Israel’s next ‘Ambassador’ to the United States, Hillel International News and Views – Blog. 
Available at http://www.hillel.org/about/news-views/news-views---blog/news-and-views/2006/02/24/vote-for- 
israel-s-next-ambassador-to-the-united-states-, accessed August 15, 2015.
53 In particular, the hiring of Avi Mayer as a new media specialist resulted in a new style of diplomacy online; see, e.g., 
http://www.jewishagency.org/blog/1/article/58, accessed August 15, 2015.
with an offer of special allotted paydays for flight attendants in the United States to engage 
in personal hasbara. These El Al Ambassadors use their free slots between flights to engage 
in small talk with local residents, sharing personal stories about living in Israel, while men- 
tioning Israel’s success in the fields of science and culture.54 The recruitment of volunteers 
was achieved most prominently through enlisting support from Israel’s biggest student union, 
in 2013.55 In times of war, full-time social media operatives are formed in what is referred 
to as war situation or operation rooms, to engage in political astroturfing (see Figure 2b).56 
Transnationally coordinated efforts and the use of multilingual Israelis reflect some of 
the most far-reaching evolutions in hasbara. The period immediately after the outbreak of 
the Second Intifada (which coincided with the ‘War on Terror’) saw the creation of what is 
termed ‘neoliberal Zionism.’57 As mentioned, these overlaps exist because capitalists and 
Zionists share some of the same ruling class networks. The pro-Israel lobby groups are 
supported by, and intimately connected with, pro-Israel Christians.58  In the Netherlands, 
hasbara volunteers are found within evangelical groups with a Zionist affinity. Their net- 
works are the Facebook group and the Twitter account Holland4Israel. As events in 2014 
show, they come together and tap into numerous virtual platforms to target pro-Palestine 
activists. However, they do not engage randomly: They adhere to well prepared and mostly
discursive campaigns. The attention given to language is therefore crucial.
The 2009 Global Language Dictionary report by The Israel Project advises how to instru- 
mentalize hasbara volunteers better.59 The report documents the methods that lie behind 
the meticulously organized media hasbara and confirms Israel’s move to a positive (soft) 
discourse by demonstrating which language should be deployed to advance the pro-Israel 
paradigm. It gives an example of how to counteract the ‘right of return’ (enshrined in UN 
General Assembly Resolution 194) by re-framing it as an unreasonable Palestinian ‘demand’ 
that is blocking peace efforts. This political recalibration is designed to reinforce the sense 
of the conflict being complicated. The report warns against declarative statements (every, 
totally, always and never) because ‘westerners think in shades of grey.’60 Another prominent 
pressure group, Yisrael Sheli [My Israel], also recommends against being argumentative
54 See the announcement and list of participants here: http://embassies.gov.il/new-york/SpeakersBureau/Pages/ 
El-Al-Ambassadors-.aspx, accessed August 15, 2015.
55 See also B. Ravid (2013) Prime Minister’s office Recruiting Students to Wage Online Hasbara Battles, Haaretz, 
August 13, 2013. Available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.541142, accessed August 
15, 2015.
56 See Corporate Watch (2012) Corporate Watch Magazine # 52, Spring/Summer 2012, for a clear explanation 
of the main idea behind ‘astroturfing,’ a term that refers to fake green grass to point at the fake endorsements 
of products: https://corporatewatch.org/magazine/52/springsummer-2012/online-astroturfing, accessed August 
15, 2015.
57 Aked et al., The UK’s pro-Israel Lobby.
58 See, for instance, Christians For Israel International. Available at http://www.c4israel.org/c4i/about_us/offices.  
59 The report was leaked to Newsweek: http://www.newsweek.com/2009/07/08/the-israel-project-s-2009-glob- 
al-language-dictionary.html., accessed March, 2010. The manual claims to be informed by polls and focus 
group experiments, although it presents no indications of methodological evidence. A number of investigative 
journalists have been tracking such hasbara projects, see: M. Blumenthal (2013) Israel Cranks up the PR 
Machine, The Nation, November 4, 2013; M. Leas (2010) Delegitimizers of Israel, Counterpunch, May; R. 
Silverstein (2009), Hasbara Spam Alert, The Guardian, January 9, 2009. The consistent reporting by Electronic
Intifada and Mondoweiss is also very helpful.
60 The report also found that certain words—accountability, children, diplomacy, prosperity, prevention, persever- 
ance—or general references—Hamas or militant Islam instead of Palestinians—work better.
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and realizing that there is a democratic community to be taken into consideration.61 They 
specifically target American liberals (Democratic Party voters) and differentiate party cadres 
(on which it can rely) from passive voters (more open to critique), who are not necessarily 
pro-Israel. Indeed, hasbara reports focus on the American public, for the obvious reason 
that they are, as US taxpayers, the main external funders of Israel, given that Israel is the 
recipient of the largest amount of US foreign spending. These recommendations clearly 
disclose where hasbara imagines its audience to exist, but it also is important to read them 
as evidence that hasbara is being forced to cope with a globally changing public—one that 
rejects war, apartheid and land appropriation. These reports have a distinctively corporate 
tone, and borrow from the formula of ‘viral marketing.’A good example of this marketization 
of hasbara is Brand Israel.62
Hasbara volunteers manipulate facts or make unfounded accusations of anti-Semitism,63 
and thus operate in a manner that is referred to as ‘trolling.’ They create public fronts from 
behind which they can attract supporters with affirmative sentiments. Whether in Amsterdam 
or Tel Aviv, the formula is the same: A group of volunteers and coordinators come together 
and produce information outlets that disseminate resources and repetitive views via online 
groups. This signals the emergence of hasbara as a more belligerent form of Israeli public 
diplomacy, e.g., the manipulation of images through digital Photoshopping (altering the 
texts on placards carried at demonstrations, from ‘Stop Israeli Terrorism’ to ‘Stop Hamas 
Terrorism on Israel’), or attributing pro-Israeli quotes to famous historical figures, such as 
Martin Luther King.64
Taken together, the policy reports, instructions and commercial strategies constitute a 
form of public relations and crowd-sourcing that are at once diplomatic and corporate. Such 
astroturfing and branding varies from selling plastic bracelets to expressing positive reac- 
tions through supposedly random posts, and they all can be mediated through the supposed 
neutral (apolitical) language of tourism or sports.65 For instance, during summer, 2014, 
Twitter followers of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were asked to re-tweet its posts with the 
additional hashtag #WorldCup in order to maximize reach (Mackey 2014).66 The essential 
point to note here is that the methodologies rely chiefly on internet infrastructures. In recent
61 Yisrael Sheli made one of the most outstanding interventions by organizing seminars teaching how to edit online 
content in favor of Israel, for a report of such a gathering see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t52LB2fYhoY. 
See also: http://www.webelieveinisrael.org/ where similar assistance and model letters are offered. Accessed 
August 15, 2015.
62 R. Hassman (2008) The Israel Brand: Nation Marketing under Constant Conflict. Available at http://spirit.tau. 
ac.il/government/downloads/Rommy_Hassman_HebBLINT.pdf, accessed August 15, 2015.
63 C. Liphshiz (2014) From Dutch Situation Room, pro-Israel Volunteers Defend Jewish State on Social Media, 
Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 29, 2014. Available at http://www.jta.org/2014/07/29/news-opinion/world/ 
in-dutch-situation-room-pro-israel-volunteers-defend-jewish-state-on-social-media, accessed August 15, 2015
64 See F. Kiblawi and W. Youmans (2015) Israel’s Apologists and the Martin Luther King Jr. Hoax, Electronic 
Intifada, August 15, 2015. Available at http://electronicintifada.net/content/israels-apologists-and-martin-luther- 
king-jr-hoax/4955, accessed August 15, 2015.
65 On rare occasions, people also coordinate offline efforts, such as pro-Israel (counter-) demonstrations. In this 
case €1400 was made selling 121 plastic bracelets in Dam Square in the capital city Amsterdam. It is important 
to note that this step was in response to three successive large pro-Palestinian demonstrations throughout the 
country. The Facebook group can be found at https://www.facebook.com/Holland4Israel/info?tab=page_info 
and the Twitter account at https://twitter.com/Holland4Israel, last accessed August 15, 2015.
66 Cf. A. Mohammed (2014) Moeen Ali and the Language of War and Protest, Islam 21C, August 18, 2014. 
Available at http://www.islam21c.com/politics/moeen-ali-and-the-language-of-war-and-protest/, last accessed 
August 15, 2015.
years, many examples of this hasbara genre have converged with social media. As I will 
discuss in more depth now, a greater intimacy began to develop between state bodies, hasbara 
projects and military campaigns. Hence, efforts to convince the international mainstream 
media that Palestinian stones are as bad as Israeli warplanes are intensely mediated through 
online videos.67 Furthermore, social media, often the first outlet for breaking news, potentially 
can weaken government interference or newsroom control. This is the double meaning of 
hasbara 2.0: the idea being that cyberspace is where a new public needs to be challenged.
The Emergence of Hasbara 2.0
We have to understand, first of all, and identify the problem that we are facing a 
very dedicated enemy who is also very sophisticated and who is now also using 
technology: Internet, Facebook and many many other things; using NGOs in a very 
sophisticated way and a large network… there is a dedicated campaign against us 
by a whole network.68
If one takes the scale, recruitment and training of those employed in hasbara activities as 
a measure, then it is clear that a sense of urgency affected Israel between 2008 and 2012. 
Hasbara 2.0 therefore arose in response to two mutually constitutive shifts: First, on a con- 
ceptual level, deciding whether hasbara was to be the aggressive propaganda variant or the 
subtle public diplomacy version; and, second, on a technical level, updating its tools (from 
Web 1 to Web 2) and practices (relying on an army of volunteers) related to what came to 
be framed as the emergence of hasbara 2.0, or digital diplomacy.
Israel’s international reputation had experienced serious damage during the 2006 Lebanon 
war, and Operation Cast Lead two years later, proved to be the main turning point. This 
military confrontation particularly heightened the international solidarity movement with 
Palestinians and it facilitated a change in international public perceptions of Israel. The 
many graphic images of people escaping bombardment or covered in detritus, video footage 
of injured or dead children, the (self-) portraits of IDF soldiers admitting to the killing of 
children that were circulated on YouTube, Facebook and Instagram and were beamed directly 
to publics across the world, all had a huge impact. During this period of intense violence, 
mainstream media outlets became more critical and thus a different approach from Israel was 
required. Israel therefore felt it had to adopt a more assertive hasbara strategy in response. 
More guidelines appeared, which urged a move away from an aggressive propagandist variety 
of hasbara, and instead recommended a more subtle variant. Yet, it cannot be denied that this 
was first and foremost a war in cyberspace that was fought over real events. The increased 
levels of hasbara came in response both to real events themselves and to pro-Palestinian 
activism around these events.
This occurred, for instance, during the 2010 attack on the Mavi Marmara aid flotilla, 
and during the November 2012 war (Pillar of Clouds) on Gaza, as well as the July–August
67 Apart from external influence, one can also read these hasbara videos as simultaneously communicating to 
Israelis that they are stronger and are winning, i.e., do not need to question their colonial policy. Besides the 
motive of distracting them from the ‘real issues’, announcing intent for Israelis themselves is thus an important 
parallel motive in much of the hasbara propaganda.
68 Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon (2010). See full talk at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=06g- 
juYT7eMU, accessed August 15, 2015.
18
Figure 3. (a) Campus based campaigns are funded by special fellowships; (b) Pro-Palestinian 
tweets compared to pro-Israel tweets with similar hashtag (courtesy Linah Alsafinah).
2014 war on Gaza.69 These hasbara campaigns thus mushroom in tandem with high levels 
of pro-Palestinian online activism. As a result, the levels of digital hasbara during these 
military assaults was intense.70 Simultaneously, these technological efforts aligned more 
strictly with ‘operational’ matters, i.e., they took place at the heart of the military. After 
the Mavi Marmara incident, the IDF launched its own blog, Twitter account and YouTube 
channel. IDF Lieutenant Aliza Landes, who was the first to initiate these activities, noted 
that the mainstream media often taps into microblogging spaces and online video channels 
and made clear that providing visual mediation was therefore indispensable.71 The YouTube 
channel had videos of successful army defences against Palestinian and Lebanese attacks 
during the 2006 war on Lebanon. However, its popularity really soared during Operation
69 It is outside this article’s scope to discuss the impact of new media on grassroots politics in Palestine. For an exten- 
sive analysis see Aouragh, Virtual Intifada; E. Siapera (2013) Tweeting #Palestine: Twitter and the Mediation 
of Palestine, International Journal of Cultural Studies, 17(6), pp. 539–555. doi: 10.1177/1367877913503865;
A. Najjar (2010) Othering the Self: Palestinians Narrating the War on Gaza in the Social Media, Journal of 
Middle East Media, 6(1), pp. 1–30.
70 B. Makuch (2014) Israel is Outgunning Hamas on Social Media, Too, Motherboard Vice, July 25, 2014. Available 
at http://motherboard.vice.com/read/israel-is-outgunning-hamas-on-social-media-too, accessed August 15, 
2015; D. Kerr (2014) How Israel and Hamas Weaponized Social Media, CNET, January 13, 2014. Available 
at http://www.cnet.com/uk/news/how-israel-and-hamas-weaponized-social-media, accessed August 15, 2015;
H. Sherwood (2014) Israel and Hamas on Social Media, Guardian, 16 July, 2014. Available at http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/16/israel-hamas-clash-social-media, accessed August 15, 2015.
71 For interesting reportage, see R. Aren (2010) available at http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/anglo-file/1.296914, 
accessed August 15, 2015.
Cast Lead, when it momentarily became the second most subscribed channel of YouTube, 
according to Jonathan Cook, in the first week of the war, a period that also coincided with 
the first systematized outsourcing of Twitter.72 Lieutenant Sacha Dratwa followed in Landes’ 
footsteps as head of the New Media Desk.73 Trained in this new field during Cast Lead, 
Dratwa pushed the IDF’s involvement in the ‘media war’ even further by coordinating many 
of the real-time online campaigns. Being a native French speaker he also led the Francophone 
online interventions. During the attack on the Mavi Marmara, English subtitles and captions 
helped to create certain interpretations that delegitimized the Palestinian narrative.74
By 2012 these hasbara-style initiatives from the IDF were synchronized as an interactive 
online branch that came under a new command, with a permanent team operating in liaison 
with the Ministry of Hasbara, and in liaison with international volunteers, as mentioned 
before.75 According to the IDF’s social media chief, Avital Leibovich, ‘The military is a 
closed organization, it doesn’t share with other people—it uses harsh language. Here we 
are exactly the opposite, we are creative, we are open, we are interacting, and we are shar- 
ing. This is something very unique.’76 The Israeli army was learning how to benefit from 
the new media ecology, largely because of the innovations of its young conscripts. Indeed, 
as she continued, ‘These [soldiers] are 19-year-olds! They’ve grown up with this technol- 
ogy and have integrated it—internalized it—completely.’77 Hasbara had to adjust to digital 
media because online media is not as impassable as the comfort-zone of the mainstream 
media. However, the issue is not that the mainstream press finally have ceased to ignore 
the Palestinian side of the story, or that journalists have become more aware and resistant 
to Israeli spin doctors per se.
Israel’s behavior and subsequent image as a military aggressor increased just as social 
media (especially Twitter) began to reconstitute journalism. We saw this most clearly during 
reporting about the war on Gaza in 2014. The combined effect of the physical presence of 
journalists (and therefore potentially more personal) and being embedded in Twitter, that 
operate outside the official media’s confines, suggests that social networking media offer 
a different algorithmic logic of news mediation. Discussing the incorporation of Twitter 
into news discourses, Zizi Papacharissi and Maria Oliveira also suggest that the rhythms of 
journalistic storytelling have changed.78 They maintain that, during the first few months of
72 J. Cook (2009) Internet Users Paid to Spread Israeli Propaganda, The Electronic Intifada, July 21, 2009. 
Available at https://electronicintifada.net/content/internet-users-paid-spread-israeli-propaganda/8355, accessed 
August 15, 2015.
73 Typical of the ‘start-up nation’s secret of success, Dratwa began an online marketing and public relations firm, 
which gave him additional experience, scope and clients. See J. Urich (2011) Meet the Head of the IDF’s New 
Media desk, Israel Defence Forces, June 27, 2011. Available at http://www.idf.il/1398-12231-en/Dover.aspx, 
last accessed August 15, 2015.
74 Kuntsman & Stein 2010; D. Allan & C. Brown (2010) The Mavi Marmara At the Frontlines Of Web 2.0, Journal 
of Palestine Studies, 40(1), pp. 63.
75 While it was named ‘Pillar of Clouds’ in Israel, for Western media the less harsh sounding name ‘Pillar of 
Defence’ was used. For Palestinians, it was a military operation that killed almost 500 Palestinians.
76 M. Borgstede (2013) Tweet Offensive: Social Media is Israeli Military’s Newest Weapon, Worldcrunch, 21 
July, 2013. Available at http://www.worldcrunch.com/culture-society/tweetoffensive-social-media-is-israeli-mil- 
itary-039-s-newest-weapon/israel-tsahal-social-media-idf-avital-leibovich-hamas-hezbollah/c3s12783/#.U-jwg- 
BZeNG5, accessed August 15, 2015
77 Ibid.
78 Z. Papacharissi & M. Oliveira (2011) The Rhythms of News Storytelling on Twitter: Coverage of the January 25th 
Egyptian Uprising on Twitter. Paper presented at the World Association for Public Opinion Research Conference, 
Amsterdam, September 2011. Available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/264645964_Affective_ 
News_and_Networked_Publics_The_Rhythms_of_News_Storytelling_on_Egypt, last accessed August 2015.
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the Arab uprisings, Twitter built on a stream of news that mainly had affective content. The 
suggestion is that such online (affective) mediated news streams are more in tune with spon- 
taneous inputs and therefore also more susceptible to emotional connections. For instance, 
‘breaking news’ is an additional mechanism underlying these rhythms, temporarily affording 
online reports the possibility of becoming news stories in themselves. However, it also could 
be the case that instant Twitter feeds are added as part of the reporting stream when access 
to the field is blocked and, at the same time, there is increased pressure on editors to report 
from the ground (as is common in the increasingly competitive news sector).
While this is indeed relevant for consideration, we cannot simply extrapolate this to 
journalism on Palestine/Israel, a topic that is considerably less open for debate. Reporting 
about Palestine is more complex and less fair,79 and so offers limited space for a news ecol- 
ogy that is geared toward positive rhythms based on affect, as suggested by Papacharissi 
and Oliveira.80 It is more likely that when access is blocked by Israel, editors still will not 
promote informal Palestinian voices to fill the gaps, as it did with various Arab bloggers 
in 2011. In other words, the fissures offered by these rhythms will be very exceptional for 
Palestine. But what if this exception is presented with an all-out war? And what does this 
suggest in terms of the visual material it bestows? Military attacks create violent images: 
Uncensored footage sometimes even is recorded by journalists themselves as they happen to 
witness attacks first hand, and on occasion they are beamed into living rooms through digital 
platforms. As journalists also utilize social media platforms, their content may become part 
of grassroots information flows. This occurred briefly in the summer of 2014.
Online Journalism: A Reckoning?
Many journalists are embedded in microblogging platforms, and they generally have a large 
number of followers. Their presence in situ offers the viewing public a direct window on 
conditions on the ground, as they share their observations. These journalists may witness 
exactly what happened before or after a bombing; reactions to this, a human response that 
comes with the repugnancy of witnessing violence, becomes a liability. Yet when they share 
this observation through an instant medium that is outside central editorial control, this 
has direct implications for Israeli public diplomacy efforts. In their raw and uncensored 
manner, the reality of the experience of the journalist is portrayed. This process begins to 
explain why the sleek and well-prepared hasbara content does not generate the same con- 
viction. For example, CNN’s Diana Magnay’s aversion was visible as she reported from 
a hilltop full of Israelis cheering the bombings of neighbourhoods in Gaza. Or the case of 
Peter Beaumont, who described how he witnessed an Israeli naval shelling ripping apart 
four children playing football on a beach: His shock is deeply ingrained in his comments 
on Twitter and in a piece for The Guardian newspaper. NBC’s Ayman Mohye ldin also
79 G. Philo & M. Berry (2011) More Bad News from Israel (London: Pluto Press); D. Baram (2004) Disenchantment: 
The Guardian and Israel (London: Guardian Books); and A. Bishara (2013) Back Stories: U.S. News Production 
and Palestinian Politics (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press).
80 Papacharissi & Oliveira, The Rhythms of News Storytelling on Twitter.
covered the same incident, recording the mothers and fathers of these children just as they 
realized what had happened.81 The response of these journalists, infused with a sense of 
indignation, becomes part of the news story itself, and, in turn, they are shared even more 
widely through their linked platforms.
In other words, the reporting by journalists in the summer of 2014, together with a far 
greater online presence, created a disconnect between Israel’s hasbara message and what was 
being reported. The fact that these are mostly journalists operating inside mainstream media 
networks causes deeper cracks in the centre of the fault lines, with the subsequent potential 
to create greater fracturing of the hasbara vision. Israeli spokespeople had great difficulty 
explaining the situation.82 In such cases hasbara efforts are intensified. Nevertheless, even 
the best versions of hasbara, applied with maximum effort, have difficulty legitimizing a 
militarily superior entity that is launching tank bombardments and airstrikes against a con- 
fined population. With some of the extraordinary events instantly flashed through online net- 
works, it has become harder to contain contradictory messages. At this point hasbara is at its 
weakest: As it reveals itself, its distortions become almost predictable. In such a high profile 
context, a corporate-style foundation for hasbara does not always succeed in its appeals. It 
is also more likely to be rejected during moments of (humanitarian) crisis. However, Israel 
is also challenged by pro-Palestinian narratives, due to the competitive nature of corporate 
media and the changing techno-social infrastructures, as argued at the outset. Such critical 
analyses help us to account for the apparent anomalies of Israeli public diplomacy, and in 
due course they also may help us to shed light on the ongoing struggles, and to challenge 
the dominant power relations in the context of the media’s changing position. The develop- 
ment of the internet has helped to change the political order and the balance of forces. I do 
not mean by this that politics can be deduced from technology, but, rather, I highlight their 
interconnectedness. The result is a techno-political dialectic that comes from both sides, 
from technological changes and a growing political consciousness. For mass media are an 
important source of information and opinion. At the same time, external dynamics (such 
as an influential protest movement) also can produce particular ideas that push against the 
dominant media framings.83 Parallel to this important dynamic, there are also changes in the 
infrastructure that allow those contesting ideas to be mediated more widely. Access to mass 
media is necessary in order to set the agenda and, if possible, to cultivate it as a free space; 
a space to which to (re)direct attention. This is where critical writings on the temporary 
synchronization between revolutionary activists’ agendas and mainstream journalism, such
81 Magnay tweeted about being harassed and called the Israelis on the hilltop ‘scum.’ She was removed from 
Palestine by her employer and sent to Moscow, provoking mocking comments about her being sent to Siberia. 
Mohyeldin commented about this on Facebook. He also was pulled out, presumably in response to his personal 
comments on Facebook. He was reinstated after a big outcry by fans and colleagues. Beaumont tweeted about 
having seen a father scraping up his son and putting the pieces into a plastic bag. See, respectively: M. Calderone 
(2014) CNN Removes Reporter Diana Magnay from Israel-Gaza after ‘Scum’ Tweet, Huffington Post, July 
18, 2014. Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/18/cnn-diana-magnay-israel-gaza_n_5598866. 
html; G. Greenwald (2014) NBC pulls veteran reporter from Gaza after witnessing Israeli attack on child, The 
Intercept, July 17, 2104. Available at https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/17/nbc-removes-ayman-mohyel- 
din-gaza-coverage-witnesses-israeli-beach-killing-four-boys/; P. Beaumont (2014) A father opens a plastic bag: 
‘This is my son’, he says, killed by an Israeli shell, Guardian, July 18, 2014. Available at http://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2014/jul/18/father-gathers-body-dead-son-two-plastic-bag-gaza-shelling, accessed August 15, 2015.
82 Israel’s chief spokesman for the country’s Prime Minister, Mark Regev, normally is allowed to out-talk his 
opponents, but during a Channel 4 interview by Jon Snow there was a confused and irritated look on his face: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_-76H-YRjs, accessed August 15, 2015.
83 Sparks, Contradictions of Capitalist Media Practice, p. 130.
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as during the 2011 Arab uprisings, can help.84 They remind us that volatile occasions give 
rise to more debate and opposition.
Indeed, when pushing too far, Israeli hasbara practices cause more damage. When asked 
to support a propagandist Facebook page that promotes Israeli tourism, while the ugliness of 
war is intensely mediated, hasbara astroturfing is unlikely to strike an emotional chord. On 
the contrary, it may lead to unforeseen results, such as inadvertent comments about the Israeli 
army, and thus it may become belligerent. Pressure from below can bring about a momentary 
synchronization of news and political dynamics. This article insists on the interface between 
the journalistic social media ecology and pro-Palestinian activism. Together they can reach 
and influence public opinion, as the next, and final, section of this article suggests.
Implications for Palestinian Solidarity
As mentioned, the notion of media ‘neutrality’ is especially necessary in ‘representative’ 
democracies, and this makes it also more vulnerable to pressure. Pro-Palestinian involvement 
(both online and offline) is therefore an indispensable part of the dynamic. Although often 
ignored by media or public diplomacy experts, it is necessary to pay attention to political 
resistance in order to obtain a full picture. When activists mobilize on a large scale, they 
can persuade sections of society. Precisely because it is not useful to provide a forensic 
assessment of hasbara activities for their own sake, I do so with this tension in mind.
A materialist concept of media and communication technologies recognizes the dialectical 
contradictions in its unsettled and dynamic social reality. For that is also why the relationship 
between mainstream media and the political and economic élite reflects a greater overlap 
with Zionist pressure groups than with ordinary people, who are neither élite nor necessarily 
pro-colonial. This contradiction suggests an antagonism that in itself can be the basis for 
struggle and progress.85 This does not mean that the mere existence of oppression is sufficient 
to achieve resistance. Dana Cloud, for instance, explains this through the difference between 
class as an objective entity, and class as a subjective consciousness.86 Changing political 
awareness inevitably will require mediation, and while attempts to change such awareness 
indeed often are tried through the media, they also can take place through activism. The 
rhetorical power of a social movement can disrupt business as usual.87 That is why I have 
argued that hasbara is not merely challenged technologically.
During contentious moments in recent years—from disrupting propaganda efforts to the 
imposition of alternative media frameworks, Israeli hasbara faced an increasingly successful 
counter-narrative. This occurs despite the fact that dominant media frameworks helped to 
manufacture an erroneous framework over several decades, always ready for hasbara to 
exploit. As noted, this is denoted most clearly by the ‘both sides’ imperative, and its exas- 
perating red flags. The small victories are the product of a political process that evolves 
the combined effect of technological tools and political activism. In this way new media
84 This argument is developed in greater detail in A. Alexander & M. Aouragh (2011) The Egyptian Experience: 
Sense and Nonsense of the Internet Revolution, International Journal of Communication, 5, pp. 1344–1358; 
and A. Alexander & M. Aouragh (2014) Egypt’s Unfinished Revolution: The Role of the Media Revisited, 
International Journal of Communication, 8, pp. 890–915.
85 L. Artz (2006) On the Material and the Dialectic: Toward a Class Analysis of Communication, in: L. Artz, S. 
Macek & D. L. Cloud (eds) Marxism and Communication Studies.
86 D. L. Cloud (2006) Change Happens: Materialist Dialectics and Communication Studies, in: L. Artz, S. Macek,
D. L. Cloud (eds) Marxism and Communication Studies, pp. 62–65, provides an interesting reflection of the 
different takes on the extent of the spontaneity of consciousness between Lukacs, Luxemburg and Gramsci.
87 L. Artz, On the Material and the Dialectic, p. 46.
strategies can converge the socio-political and techno-material dynamics and help bust the 
pro-Israel myths. As mentioned, hasbara has made several important adaptations relating 
to precisely these digital media changes in coordination with the army.
During the 2014 war on Gaza, the IDF had 292,000 Twitter followers and was offering 
dozens of updates a day, including infographs. However, these figures cannot be taken at face 
value. Its presence was indeed far superior to that offered by Palestinian military groups, such 
as al-Qassam (the military wing of Hamas), whose account on Twitter had merely 11,900 
followers in the same period.88 Online media is shaped by an existing colonization of digital 
infrastructures that reflect the reality of cyber imperialism.89 The fact is that existing dominant 
platforms block most of al-Qassam’s accounts, since the majority of companies are hosted 
in the United States and abide by state wishes and policy regulations. Thus the internet is 
not a democratic space: Many platforms are not neutral but follow corporate or state orders 
that mostly favor Israel. But if we zoom out from the military actors, where there is such an 
unequal balance of forces, and zoom into activist groups, then the number of people sharing 
and liking hashtags in support of Palestinians is much higher, with pro-Palestinian tweets than 
being far more numerous than those produced by hasbara. The #GazaUnderAttack (Figure 
3(b)) tweets during the war illustrate this.90 The fact that celebrities (e.g., Dwight Howard, 
the basketball player, and Rihanna, the singer) posted tweets with the #FreePalestine hashtag 
also reflects how broadly this political dispositionality is embraced.91
Moreover, the contradiction of hyper-mediations turns hasbara audiences into witnesses 
of injustice. An example of this dynamic is the online video, What Is It Like to Be Attacked 
By Rocks? It shows scenes of Palestinian youths throwing stones, and it ends dramatically 
with the question: ‘The media consider rock-throwing a harmless provocation. Do you still 
agree?’ The stark irony is that cars pass by on Israeli-only roads in West Bank settlements. 
These discursive and visual tools become hasbara’s own nemesis by disclosing the illegal 
presence of Israeli colonial settlers, providing evidence of apartheid.92 Similarly, in the What 
it’s like to be hit by rockets video, the casualty is a cat that falls from a tree. Again, compared 
to footage of air bombardments of densely populated apartment blocks in Gaza, this only 
confirms the military inequality. These contradictions do not just occur as such, they are 
identified by critics and offered to the media as part of larger awareness campaigns. The 
tireless attempts of Palestinian activists and their international supporters therefore answers 
why hasbara has refocused much of its attention toward the activist spaces and networks. 
This is exactly why the media are not the only space of contention for hasbara.
This perspective offers a better explanation of why, despite Israel’s status as an unscru- 
pulous rival with an undeniably stunning media apparatus and a very well-funded public 
diplomacy, hasbara is not very successful in winning hearts and minds. This perspective
88 In D. Kerr, How Israel and Hamas Weaponized Social Media. Al-Qassem is considered ‘a member of a desig- 
nated foreign terrorist organization’, hence banned from YouTube. Whatever the reasoning is, the result is that 
state violence is preferred over non-state violence.
89 M. Aouragh (2012) Social Media, Mediation and the Arab Revolutions, Triple-C: Communication, Capitalism
& Critique, 10(2), pp. 518–536.
90 Cf. B. Dabour (2014) In Asymmetric Twitter War over Gaza, Palestinians are Winning, Electronic Intifada, August 
21, 2014. Available at http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/belal-dabour/asymmetric-twitter-war-over-gaza-pales-
tinians-are-winning, accessed August 15, 2015.
91 Cf. A. Kaczynski (2014) Rihanna tweets ‘#FreePalestine,’ quickly deletes tweet, BuzzFeed, July 15, 2014. 
Available at http://www.buzzfeed.com/andrewkaczynski/rihanna-tweets-freepalestine-quickly-deletes-tweet#. 
glwvGrbP, accessed August 15, 2015.
92 See the video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZC7A-Lr4Eo, accessed August 15, 2015.
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becomes clear once we step outside the disciplinary confines of media studies and regard 
mediation as a convergence of socio-political and techno-material factors. For example, 
as a consequence of Israeli military violence (in 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008–09, 2010, 
2012, 2014), protests began to accumulate and gather speed. This is reflected in a number 
of surveys conducted between 2002 and 2012. The 2014 attack on Gaza furthered this 
increasingly critical international public opinion. In the UK the YouGov and The Sunday 
Times’ polls showed that 62 percent of the public believed that the Israeli government was 
committing war crimes, and 51 percent of those polled by The Sunday Times stated that 
Israel’s actions were unjustified. This increase in sympathy for the Palestinians is particularly 
interesting in traditionally pro-Israeli media outlets, such as The Sunday Times.93 A growing 
number of people place Israel, together with Iran, Pakistan and North Korea, as the most 
negatively rated countries. Specifically in EU countries, views on Israeli influence have 
hardened in Spain (74 percent negative rating, up 8 points) and in France (65 percent, up 9 
points). Negative ratings in Germany (69 percent) and Britain (68 percent) remain high. In 
other English-speaking countries, negative views about Israeli policies also have risen: In 
Australia (65 percent negative rating, up 7 points) and in Canada (59 percent, up 7 points).94 
The decline of support among the Jewish community in the UK is particularly telling. British 
Jews have become increasingly uncomfortable with the right-wing politics of Israel and the 
ethno-racial expectation that they will close ranks for its sake.95
Political engagement on university campuses is among the most interesting challenge 
that is causing shifts in the public’s opinion vis-à-vis Israel. This engagement, in turn, also 
explains the growth of campus activities by hasbara campaigns. Progressive student bodies 
endorsing divestment campaigns, such as Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS), increas- 
ingly weaken pro-Israel lobbies and antagonize hasbara initiatives. Consequently, Israel has 
experienced a growing number of celebrities cancelling cultural events in Israel, at a level 
that is similar to the boycott and divestment campaigns during the apartheid era in South 
Africa. It is likely that the growth in boycott campaigns and the increase in street protests 
have pushed previously controversial topics regarding Palestine further into the public arena. 
Similarly, it is unsurprising that the Israeli government and its hasbara strategy have iden- 
tified BDS as a key strategic threat. The double entendre, ‘Don’t believe the BS in BDS!’, 
used by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his speech at the 2014 American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) meeting, is telling.96 However, this top-level response 
to a largely grassroots campaign further demonstrates that ordinary people can contradict 
hasbara messages that emanate via the same dominant media on which public diplomacy 
relies, and in due course can construct an independent discourse. This dynamic clarifies 
why hasbara must be refined and yet how, in doing so, it repeatedly fails, or rather why 
the contradictions that exist between the Israeli message and its reality are becoming ever 
wider. The additional angle of politically active engagement makes clear that a particular 
consciousness can be nurtured beyond the reach of public relations or diplomacy.
93 For both questionnaires see: http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/ejq2q2g7ym/Internal_ 
Results_140728_War_Crimes_W.pdf; http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/ytggo8ho42/YG-Arc 
hive-Pol-Sunday-Times-results-140725.pdf, accessed August 15, 2015.
94 See this extensive assessment by the BBC: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/may12/BBCEvals_ 
May12_rpt.pdf.
95 Aked et al., The UK’s pro-Israel Lobby.
96 For the full transcript of his speech, see: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.577920, accessed 
August 15, 2015.
Conclusion: Meticulous Strategy, Magnificent Failure
This ostentatiously outrageous lie reads not as evasion, but as a deliberate and cruel 
assertion of power, not only over life and death, but, at least in the Gaza strip, over 
truth itself.97
For Palestinians, hasbara does something definite: it mediates not only the exercise of power 
over life and death, but over truth itself. Hasbara has become a multi-levelled project: some 
can be understood as a form of public diplomacy, or seductive branding, while others take 
the form of aggressive soft power, or psyops. Following a framework that befits liberal 
nation-states, mainstream public diplomacy literature provides a separation of these two 
roles: One where the monopoly and exertion of violence is veiled. This is not the case with 
Israel, which, according to Molad,
is perceived in the international community as militaristic, masculine, religious, stiff- 
necked, dangerous, chauvinist, and frightening, and is constantly identified in the 
international media with images of conflict.98
This change mostly is associated with Israel’s military operations. International public opin- 
ion gradually, and perhaps irrevocably, has shifted toward one in which Israel is perceived 
as a military aggressor. Simply put, it is more difficult to mask images of conflict when 
one perpetually is involved in wars. The underlying truth of colonialism, obscured by an 
ideological bias (Zionism), does not allow hasbara to arrive at the most logical explanation 
that would be in tune with most public relations approaches or media analyses. In answer 
to Schleifer (cited at the beginning of this article), who asked how it is that a state with 
nuclear weapons and reputable intelligence services could fail, the answer is contained in 
the question. The primacy given to military doctrines, Israel’s permanent condition, directs 
us to what causes the hasbara stalemate. Hasbara cannot make a ‘post-conflict’ shift as 
long as it is not based on justice for Palestinians, which, of course, would undermine the 
Zionist project itself. Thus, hasbara is trapped between a rock and a hard place as this 
article illustrated. The difference between opinions of governments and ordinary publics 
regarding Israel epitomizes the immense contradictions. That is why public diplomacy needs 
to be assessed through state and non-state dynamics, increase of support for Palestine and 
critique of Israel coincide.
In response to growing international criticism hasbara has undertaken a number of make- 
overs—refined its earlier style to a slick ‘cast doubt’ strategy. In the ‘Hamas Rockets’ red 
flag model a handmade grenade damaging a tree in Israel, and an Israeli F16 killing 25 
people in a massive blast are measured against the same philosophical or ethical standards. 
Such a conceptual levelling of politics and experiences in a greatly uneven reality reverses 
oppression and resistance, or cause and effect. This article explored the role of the internet 
for public diplomacy with reference to techno-military forces and has illustrated how this 
process intersects with, and is influenced by, a changing media ecology and journalism 
more generally.
The asymmetry in the military field and the strength and resources of Israeli social 
media—construed by existing double standards, e.g., online platforms are blocking Hamas
97 Miéville, The Lies that Aren’t Meant to Deceive Us.
98 Molad (2012) Israeli Hasbara: Myths and Facts, p. 11.
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pages while accommodating those of the IDF—clearly outweigh those of the Palestinians. 
However, the overall impact of the Palestinians on social media outweighs that of Israel, 
defying the mathematical logic that one might presume applies. That an opponent with more 
resources, superior access to intelligence and crucial international backing is not able fully to 
impose its will is an important confirmation of activist efforts and solidarity. To understand 
these contradictory dynamics better, we must take the conceptual dispute outside of the 
media realm and reconverge it with offline strategies, with grassroots activism. And amid 
the deeply unequal balance of forces, the struggle for justice only can be a long-term one. 
It is important to remember that the grassroots struggle against Apartheid South Africa took 
many decades; without all those initial cracks in the projection of white supremacy by all 
the big and small solidarity groups across the world, it would not have managed to emanate 
as a collective that managed to pressure international governments to end their diplomatic 
and economic support for South Africa.
The lacuna between Israel’s desired public persona and overall international perception 
continues to deepen and pro-Palestinian movements are gaining public support. If anything, 
the examples discussed in this article have shown that occasions of war create cracks in the 
dominant media narrative. It is when a parallel common sense seeps through, one that defies 
many of hasbara’s attempts to ‘explain’ it all away. This ‘common sense’ is captured by the 
words chanted in the streets of many capitals across the world in July and August 2014: ‘In 
our thousands—in our millions—we are all Palestinians.’ This striking chant proclaims that 
(pro-) Palestinian public diplomacy, not relying on government interventions, is an interna- 
tional and above all people’s objective. The basic fact, therefore, is that every time Israeli 
propaganda becomes more masterful in its techniques and receives more budgets, it ends in 
disappointment. Paradoxically, grassroots diplomacy —a public relations that is formed by 
universal principles of justice and equality—offers qualities that money cannot buy, hence 
a more aggressive hasbara tends to mobilize more solidarity for Palestinians in the process.
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